Alexander’s Anti-Determinism

Free will was not invented all at once, but according to Olivier Boulnois, the most decisive step was taken by the later Greek philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias (late 2nd to early 3rd century CE). Alexander is the first to articulate the metaphysical presuppositions that will be used by medieval and modern defenders of a radically free will, even though there is no phrase corresponding to “free will” in Alexander’s Greek. This line of thought emerges out of a polemic against the Stoic doctrine of an all-inclusive Fate. Here is a commented translation of the first half of Boulnois’s chapter on Alexander in Généalogie de la liberté.

Although “free will” is the standard English translation for the Latin phrase liberum arbitrium, in Latin it means literally “free arbitration”. In the title of Augustine’s famous early treatise De libero arbitrio voluntatis (“On Free Arbitration by the Will”), it is voluntatis that corresponds to will. The Latin arbitrium is an act of arbitration, not an actor. Arbitrio is a grammatical variant that does not change that meaning. The French arbitre on the other hand is a grammatical variant that does change the meaning. It refers to an agent rather than an act. The substitution of “will” in the English takes the further step of localizing and centralizing the agent’s agency into a distinct faculty or power.

My own perspective is that humans are free in several ways, one of which is that we are generally able to act based on an evaluation of alternatives. The evaluation of what is appropriate may be nearly immediate and only implicit, or it may involve an extensive process that develops unevenly, and remains open-ended. At least some of the time, we are also able to step back and expressly consider what criteria are most applicable to whatever we are dealing with. But these are kinds of practical freedom that are neither a metaphysical given nor a universal accomplished fact. Practical freedom is “acquired”, unevenly and provisionally, in a process that is never quite done. It involves feeling as well as thought. But what comes to be called free will is a far stronger claim than this; I think it is too strong.

Boulnois contests Nietzsche’s claim that free will is an invention of Christian theologians. That dubious honor goes to a philosopher, Alexander of Aphrodisias. The first Christian thinker to give a systematic role to free arbitration, the early Greek church father Origen of Alexandria, explicitly references Alexander’s discussion.

Yet while Alexander and the Greek church fathers already radicalize human autexousion (self-authority or self-power), they still treat it as a rational arbitration, grounded in deliberation. (Tertullian, the first Latin Christian theologian, will separately introduce voluntas or will into the Latin theological tradition, as a reified, independent faculty of arbitration. Using terminology from Roman law, Tertullian treats the voluntas as a dominus — absolute master over its own acts — wielding the legal authority (imperium) of a Roman emperor over the soul’s functions. But he still expects the will to ground its decisions in rational deliberation. Later writers explicitly elevate the posited will’s choice above reason, and remove its dependence on deliberation. This makes will into a power capable of choosing arbitrarily.)

According to Boulnois, Alexander’s metaphysicalization of human autexousion and his transformation of prohairesis from the resolution of a deliberation into a punctual “choice” already do the main work of radicalizing human freedom.

“Although Aristotle and the Stoics, each in a very different way, were able to provide a basis for responsibility without appealing to free will, the latter has become the key to human action. Where? How? Why?… For this we must look to Alexander of Aphrodisias” (p. 223, my translation throughout).

Though the Aristotelian commentary tradition did not begin with him, Alexander is the oldest commentator from whom a substantial body of work survived in later times. Relatively speaking, he is also the most purely Aristotelian. Alexander is the Greek commentator most highly esteemed by al-Farabi and the subsequent Arabic tradition. Aquinas defends Alexander’s account of soul and intellect against the criticism of Averroes — somewhat surprisingly, since the Latin tradition generally follows Averroes in rejecting Alexander’s “materialism”.

In comparison to Aristotle and Plato, the Stoics drastically narrow the notion of cause. They count only “productive” causes, and further claim that these can only be physical bodies. The Stoic logos and pneuma that give the world rationality and definite form are understood in terms of a subtle fiery “body” that permeates all things. Meanwhile, effects are said to be predicates that belong to a broader class of incorporeal “sayables” (lekta) that do not have independent existence. From this point of view, existence is only properly said of bodies. The Stoics also follow the Megarians in denying any independent reality to potentiality, a stance that had been sharply criticized by Aristotle.

Living in an era that was philosophically dominated by the Stoic system, Alexander sharply polemicizes against the Stoics. Nonetheless, he is deeply affected by the Stoic notion of causality. He adopts the exact Stoic phrase poietikon aition (making or doing or productive cause) as a replacement for Aristotle’s subtler and non-univocal notion of a “source or cause of being moved, or of being at rest”, which most centrally refers to things like the art of building. It is the Stoic and Alexandrist poietikon aition that was translated to medieval Latin as causa efficiens or efficient cause. While formally defending Aristotle’s view that the first cause acts only as a final cause or good to which things are attracted, Alexander undermines it from within. He basically accepts the Stoic view that to be a cause is to be productive, and in general prioritizes the new “efficient” cause over the final and formal causes that Aristotle regards as more primary. This will carry great weight in neoplatonism, Arabic philosophy, Latin scholasticism, and Western modernity.

Alexander’s readings of Aristotelian texts are also marked by an implicit acceptance of the Stoic idea that philosophy should take the form of a rigorous system. Thus he aims to show that Aristotle too is the author of a system, but a better one. A related claim of Alexander’s — that will be influentially taken up by al-Farabi — is that Aristotle’s Metaphysics should be read as presenting a demonstrative science of substance that yields certainty in knowledge, rather than, say, consisting in a dialectical or hermeneutic inquiry that remains in principle open-ended.

Whatever conclusions we may reach on these matters, Alexander forcefully rejects the central Stoic doctrine of an all-encompassing Fate. Even though Alexander’s Greek has no equivalent for the term “free will”, contemporary specialist scholarship has treated Alexander as the first ethical “libertarian”, or strong advocate of the concept we know as free will. (There are better, more Aristotelian grounds for rejecting Stoic determinism as a theory of causality, but these have been historically much less influential.)

At the same time, nature for Alexander has the same strict determinism that it does for the Stoics — only he exempts human deciders. This creates a sharp split between the human and nature that neither Aristotle nor the Stoics would have endorsed.

“Alexander expressly recognizes the existence of a causal determinism, but he limits it to nature. Like the Stoics, he admits that the same cause in the same circumstances always produces the same effect. In nature, each being necessarily produces its effect in conformity with its nature: ‘fate and nature are identical’. Thus animals move themselves naturally, according to their impulse, and at the same time under the action of fate: they necessarily effectuate the movements that proceed from their proper impulse. — But what is proper to the human, acting according to reason, opens for us another order. For all that falls under art (tekhne), including human action, is not subject to fate. The fundamental opposition is between nature and art, that is to say between necessity and human resolution: natures are in themselves the principle of their movement and of their becoming, while ‘the things produced by art and by resolution (proairesis) have the principle of their movement and their efficient cause outside of themselves, and not in themselves; and in their surging, in one who produces them, a discourse intervenes’ ” (pp. 224-225, emphasis in original throughout).

The strong claim that the same cause in the same circumstances always produces the same effect contradicts Aristotle’s literal text. Aristotle carefully says that what we regard as the “same” cause or reason why usually has the same consequences. This is not just a superficial “statistical” weakening of an otherwise univocal account of causes. Aristotle’s own view of causes as “reasons why” is not only pluralist but inherently non-univocal. The Stoics on the other hand insist that causality must be understood in a univocal way. Alexander is deeply swayed by this.

Alexander has been called an essentialist, in a somewhat derogatory way. Elsewhere this may have to do with an excessive emphasis on substance, which would seem to cut off the most interesting aspects of the Metaphysics. Here it shows up in the way he treats nature, as governed by necessity. To straightforwardly identify nature with necessity understood in a deterministic way is to lose all the “liveliness” that nature and natures have in Aristotle.

“There are two ways of acting: according to nature and according to art, that is to say according to reason (logos). In contrast to the products of nature, the works of art result from a choice operated by their productive cause, the human. These presuppose a power accompanied by logos, that is capable of contraries: to work, we must deliberate. Thus while nature operates necessarily, art comes from choice and from speech. The lyre is not tuned by fate; it could be untuned, or tuned a different way. For Alexander, art is an anti-fate; and it includes human action” (p. 225).

This dichotomy of nature and art in Alexander does not do justice to either nature or art in Aristotle. Nature is not rigidly deterministic, and at the same time there can be no art in Aristotle’s sense without determination. Determination in Aristotle is not deterministic. For Aristotle, to meaningfully and seriously say things and make assertions is not to claim that we have said the last word. On the flip side, not only does art in Aristotle’s sense of techne or technique not imply a deep indeterminism; art or craft does imply a basis in understanding that can be articulated in a definite (but not rigid) way, which is to say a kind of determination.

In Alexander we see, side-by-side as it were, a recognizably Aristotelian register or registers of speech-logos-reason-deliberation on the one hand, and what I would call a Stoic emphasis on production and “productive cause” on the other. This kind of unresolved or only partially resolved duality between textually Aristotelian elements and other non-Aristotelian elements or meanings is a common pattern in scholastic philosophy as well. Recognizably Aristotelian words are used, but given new senses, whose connection with what I would like to call their Aristotelian meanings is tenuous or nonexistent. (I don’t really believe that the real Aristotelian meanings are just there for inspection, waiting to be grabbed, but I do believe it is possible to make increasingly good judgments about them.)

“This analysis has an Aristotelian allure, but in identifying action [praxis] with art, and art with thought, it changes the meaning. For in Aristotle, we cannot operate this identification: certainly ‘what is produced in view of something’ falls under ‘all that can be produced by thought, and all that happens comes from nature’; but nature according to Aristotle is not deterministic. It includes spontaneity (automaton) and chance (tukhe). — Thus the principal effect of the distinction generalized by Alexander is to distinguish between nature and human activity; that will soon be to say, between necessity and choice” (pp. 225-226).

What Boulnois calls the Aristotelian allure of Alexander’s account has to do with its references to textually Aristotelian things like speech, logos, reason, and deliberation. I think it is fairly clear that none of these has anything to do with a radical indeterminism. Meanwhile, the emphasis on production and productive cause (despite its later pervasive adoption) implies a fundamentally non-Aristotelian (more Stoic) view of causes.

Something like this view of cause as essentially productive comes to be treated as canonical in Avicenna, Aquinas, and the scholastic mainstream. Now we have a much earlier example in Alexander. And given the large presence of Alexander in the background to Plotinus’s writing, it seems appropriate to also consider Alexandrist roots of the neoplatonic mainstream’s view of cause as productive. (In the case of neoplatonism, there are also middle Platonic sources independent of Alexander.)

“The question of decision (or of resolution) is henceforth thought starting from an opposition between animality and rationality. It will depend on a cut between animal impulse, considered as deterministic; and human choice, free because it is rational. From then on, the Aristotelian rootedness of action in animal movement is lost. The question is detached from its original grounding” (p. 226).

Choice that is considered free because it is rational is a good thing. It is not at all the inherent disaster that freedom as a metaphysical property of a metaphysical thing called will is. But as Boulnois points out, Alexander combines this with a radical division between human choice and animality. Aristotle says that a man and an ox are animals in the same sense. Our qualification as rational or talking animals in no way conflicts with our status as rational or talking animals. This makes it crystal clear that for Aristotle, animality cannot be equated with irrationality or unfreedom.

“Alexander agrees with the Stoics on the way in which animals move themselves. They receive an impulsion from desire. They orient their movements according to their ‘assent’. The conjunction of impulse and assent constitutes ‘what depends on them’. But their spontaneity is turned toward a single thing, the movement that is proposed to them by their representations: their capacity to act is monovalent. The Stoics draw a compatibilist conclusion: ‘they profess that what happens with the animals in being submitted to fate depends on the animals, but equally that it happens in a necessary way’. For the animals, the Stoics admit at once a power of acting by themselves, and a necessary determination of the impulses: the actions produced by the animals are no less necessary than other events; but they happen through them” (ibid).

(I actually doubt the claim that action in animals is strictly monovalent. The Stoic Chrysippus reportedly offered anecdotal evidence that a dog can be seen doing very simple reasoning about alternatives. Following a scent, the dog in Chrysippus’s anecdote comes to a fork in the road, sniffs one side and finds nothing, then immediately takes the other branch without sniffing it too. My own dog loves to play fetch, but also likes to jump up on the bed and play with the object. But he knows that if he does so, I may end the game. So he grabs the object, looks up toward the bed as if considering jumping up there, then turns back and brings me the object. He may not have concepts like a human does, but this behavior seems to show a practical grasp of elementary negation. He also often heeds a simple “No!”.)

“Does the specificity of the human radically alter the problem? Not for the Stoics, who see in the mind a unity that includes character, beliefs, and desires. Once the resulting impulse is triggered, it is impossible for the agent to act otherwise: there is no ‘alternative possibility’; indeed nothing that could be called a ‘free arbitration’ [libre arbitre]. As a result, there is no essential difference between the animal and the human” (pp. 226-227).

The Stoic concept of irresistible impulse as a kind of triggering cause seems very doubtful to me. (Even my dog visibly resists his impulse to jump up on the bed.) On the other hand, that we are governed by our character, desires, and beliefs seems like a tautology. We attribute character, desires, and beliefs to others based on what they say and do. These are sustained or repeated patterns of appearance.

“For Alexander, on the contrary, it is necessary to highlight this specific difficulty: like other living things, the human acts willingly, but it is proper to her to accomplish the actions that ‘depend on us’. An action depends on us if we are ‘its principle and the efficient cause’. It is necessary to clearly distinguish two concepts that, in Aristotle, are very close: [quote from Alexander:] ‘Willingness [hekousion] is not identical to “what depends on us”. For that action is willing that results from an unconstrained assent, and depending on us is the act that accompanies assent conforming to a reason and a judgment [krisis]. This is why if something depends on us, it is also willing, but not all that is willing depends on us’ ” (p. 227).

That they are not identical is true. But it is an unfortunate accident of history that our English terms “willing” and “voluntary” appear to presuppose a separate faculty of will. The root hekon in Homer applies to an action undertaken gladly or whole-heartedly. Before it became a philosophical term, it was used in Greek law as a basis for culpability. Someone who kills someone hekon is culpable for murder. Even the Latin voluntas originally referred to a specific inclination, intention, or wish, rather than a separate faculty of will.

”The Stoics confuse ‘what depends on us’ with willingness. For animals have voluntary movement, but they do not have what depends on us, the humans. It is proper to the rational adult to give her assent according to reason, by a deliberation that concludes in a judgment. The interiorization already at work in the Stoics changes the sense of the return to Aristotle: what depends on us is no longer a category of actions, but a power in us, reason, which allows us to judge before assenting. ‘Willingness’ is opposed to exterior constraint; ‘what depends on us’ is characterized by rationality, and this is why it is opposed to necessity” (ibid).

Ironically, on this point about what is up to us, Alexander is closer to the Stoics he criticizes than to Aristotle. Alexander accepts the Stoic view that only interior acts of reasoning, judgment, assent, and choice are up to us.

Aristotle is quite different. After a long enumeration of things it does not make sense to deliberate about, he concludes: “none of these things could happen through us. We deliberate about things that are up to us and are matters of action, and these are the ones that are left…. And among human beings, each sort deliberates about the things to be done by its own acts…. So it seems, as was said, that a human being is the source of actions and that deliberation is about the things to be done by oneself” (Nicomachean Ethics book III ch. 3, Sachs tr., pp. 42-43; see Willingness, Deliberation, Choice).

Boulois continues, “Alexander nonetheless admits an influence of nature in the human, under the form of character: the ‘character (ethos) of humans is their daimon, according to Heraclitus, that is to say their nature‘. Each receives from nature a temperament that is proper to her, and this explains why, in the same circumstances, different individuals make different decisions. Nonetheless this intervenes as a disposition, but not as the determining cause” (ibid).

“Alexander of Aphrodisias thus proposes a sort of wager on the autonomy of our resolution (which from now on well deserves the name of free arbitration [libre arbitre]). If we reduce human deliberation to nothing, there is no more merit or possibility of exhortation, and it is no longer necessary to make the least effort. Human life thus ceases to be livable. As a consequence, even if we don’t know that there is the ‘what depends on us’ (houtos eph’ hemin), any more than the contrary, it is better to hold, even if it is an error, that we are masters of our actions, than to admit that we are determined by fate. This point Nietzsche saw well: it is necessary to believe in free will [libre arbitre] because it is necessary for life. This belief is a wager; we admit it as a necessary error” (p. 228).

Alexander associates human resolution or “choice” with a kind of radical contingency. Aristotle on the contrary emphasizes the way in which proairesis intelligibly follows from the results of deliberation.

“Before Alexander of Aphrodisias, middle Platonism had already developed a bivalent concept of ‘what depends on us’. This brought with it a connection between the doctrine of action and the indetermination of the contingent. Alcinous declares in effect: ‘the possible […] is indeterminate’, and according to whether the ‘what depends on us’ inclines toward one side or the other, it becomes true or false. He applies the indetermination of the future contingent (Aristotle, On Interpretation, 9) to the concept of ‘what depends on us’, which thus becomes a faculty of decision. A part of the future being indeterminate, if an action depends on us, it is our resolution that ensures that it occurs, if we choose it, and that it does not occur if we do not choose it. But this implies that our choice is not predetermined. — The identification of ‘what depends on us’ with the Platonic sovereignty of the soul allows an escape from the determinism of desire evoked by Aristotle. This formula is finally summarized in the adage: ‘The soul is without master, and it depends on it to act or not to act,’ which establishes by collage an equivalence between Plato and Aristotle, between the Republic and the Eudemian Ethics, between the sovereignty of the soul and the ambivalence of action. — In the same way, pseudo-Plutarch identifies, within the contingent, that which can just as well occur as not occur, with an action that ‘depends on us and our resolution’: for example, walking” (pp. 228-229, ellipses in original throughout).

“Alexander founds this ambivalence on a doctrine of assent that integrates the Aristotelian analysis of action: the human is distinguished from other living things in that she possesses speech (logos). The latter is capable of contraries, and allows her to judge which things deserve to be chosen:” (p. 229).

[quote from Alexander:] “If, when submitted to an examination, the objects of representation are those that were shown from the beginning, she gives her assent to the representation, and in this way follows her objects, while if these appear different, or if something preferable appears, she chooses it, abandoning what appeared from the beginning to deserve to be chosen (haireton)” (ibid).

Here we see also that Alexander adopts the Stoic idea of what we call representation.

“It is reason (logos) that judges and that entails choice. It surpasses representations and gives proof of their truth. It allows us to prefer what really is better” (p. 230).

“Our mastery [sic] not only concerns our actions, but again our ability to decide: ‘we are at the same time masters of deliberating and of choosing what follows from the deliberation’. What is the sense of this deliberation? ‘The fact that because we have the power of choosing (exousian tes haireseos) actions, […] what appears according to reason as most deserving to be chosen, we choose and accomplish in place of (pro) the other’. Here, prohairesis (resolution, decision), becomes a power of preferential choice: the taking of one thing more than another. Deliberation, because it arbitrates between what we would have done in acceding to the first sensible representation, and what reason presents to us as better, allows us to choose between two eventualities. It opens two possible worlds. It is not a matter of demanding whether the agent could have done otherwise, in general — on the condition that her mental states and the circumstances were different — but: all things being otherwise equal, is there “the possibility of acting otherwise”? For the Stoics do not admit such an alternative possibility: for them, ‘it is impossible, given these circumstances, that we do not act’. Nonetheless it is thus that deliberation founds our capacity to choose between contraries. It gives us a ‘power of choice’. Alexander understands the principle of mastery as applying not to actions taken in a specific sense, but to each action seen in its singularity” (ibid).

This is Alexander’s new idea of proaireseis as a punctual act of choice. Alexander makes the unprecedented claim that in a human, there is an inner power of choice that does not depend on anything.

Not to put too much weight on a word, but I have a sort of Hegelian allergy to claims about mastery and sovereignty. These are too strong. What we have are abilities and capabilities. Mastery is not something we should seek in ethics. Unlimited mastery is what a tyrant wants. It is a defective concept of agency, which wants to insist in an unqualified way on the “independence” of the agent. This is an extreme example of what Hegel calls one-sidedness. As Brandom says, mastery is an evolutionary dead end. But Alexander is asserting here that we — individually, here and now — have just this sort of unlimited mastery over a strictly inner domain in which choices occur.

The ethical notion of agency — that what we do makes a difference in the way that things turn out — needs to be separated from all these supercharged, absolutist notions. This is precisely why the current investigation is so important.

“It is necessary to distinguish two senses of this principle: (1) The principle of mastery [sic] in the generic sense: in general, we have the power to lie or not to lie; when we lie, this depends on us, and when we do not lie, this also depends on us. (And this is the Aristotelian sense.)” (ibid).

This merely generic form of “mastery” that Boulnois attributes to Aristotle does not have the total and unconditional character that Hegel objects to. It is just an ability. Thus for the sake of clarity, I prefer to call it something else.

“(2) The principle of mastery, in the singular sense: here and now, I have the power to lie or not to lie. (And this is the sense retained by Alexander” (pp. 230-231).

This does have a total and unconditional character. It is far more than just an ability.

“The generic principle of mastery [sic] is perfectly compatible with the principle of determination by causes (action is determined by my beliefs and my desires). According to this principle, my action is determined, here and now, by my desires and my beliefs, even if here and now I cannot avoid lying. There is no contradiction between the principle (1): in general I have the power to lie and not to lie, and the principle of determinism, (3): every action is necessarily determined by its causes. Thus the Aristotelian theory of action is compatible with determinism. But there is a contradiction between the singularized principle of mastery (2): here and now, I have the power to lie or not to lie, and the fact (4): here and now (taking into account my beliefs and my desires), I am determined to lie. This is to say that in taking the principle of mastery in the singular sense (2), Alexander rejects determinism” (p. 231).

Here Boulnois speaks rather loosely of “determinism” in relation to Aristotle. But based on other passages, what he really means to attribute to Aristotle is that a) a radical indeterminism of choice is ruled out, and b) there is a relative “determination” by causes or reasons that gives definite form to things, without completely locking them down.

“This singular power gives a new significance to prohairesis: we choose one thing more than another, because reason presents to us not just one action represented as desirable, but a judgment that allows us to see another as preferable. The possibility of choice between actions pertains to our deliberation, itself understood as reason, able to see contraries. This is why our faculty of choosing is ambivalent” (ibid).

Deliberation is a weighing of alternatives. This is something we can do, without any super powers. But in his eagerness to combat Stoicism, Alexander gives deliberation an absolutist foundation it does not need. On the other hand, though, there is nothing obviously wrong with what he says about reason. And the argument does have the “Aristotelian allure” that Boulnois mentioned earlier.

“The root of punishability (indeed of responsibility) resides in the fact that an act depends on us, because we have chosen it: [quote from Alexander:] ‘To which acts do chastisements reasonably apply? To no others than those that are accomplished according to a bad choice (hairesin) that has been made. In consideration of this, in effect those who have the power of choice (exousia tes haireseos), who omit to pose as the aim of their proper actions the good and the law, but who, circumventing this and acting in view of profit or pleasure, do evil’ ” (ibid).

Aristotle is concerned with whether actions are good or bad. Alexander interiorizes this to decisions or choices.

“It is a bad use of the faculty of choice that makes action bad. Compared to Aristotle, Alexander pulls the principle of responsibility back a bit. This interiorization intervenes against the Stoics and those who follow them, because what is deserving of praise or blame is not the action, but the choice to do it. Alexander pulls back again in relation to Aristotle. Like him, he distinguishes willing actions (shared with the animals) from actions taken by choice, for which we have the power to do the contrary (and which are contingent). But from here on, it is always to this second level that praise and blame apply. The agent must respond, less for her action, (because it is hers: Aristotle) than for her choice (because she chose it in contingency: Alexander). Responsibility not only relates the agent to her action, but first of all relates the agent to her decision. Henceforth, responsibility and causality are dissociated. They are no longer two descriptions of the same phenomenon, like two sides of a coin. Quite to the contrary, starting from Alexander, responsibility (having become free will [libre arbitre]), diverges from causal dependency, and even comes to oppose it” (p. 232).

For Alexander, we are responsible for something not because we are its cause, but rather precisely because our choice is exempt from causality. Boulnois rightly identifies this with the later notion of free will, even though Alexander does not speak of will.

“According to Alexander, even one who professes determinism, when she deliberates, cannot avoid asking herself: ‘must I do this, or not do it?’ We have at once the ability to act or not to act (contradiction), and that of doing a thing or its contrary (contrariety). But this double ambivalence of action is rooted in that of choice: we have first of all the power to choose or not choose to act, and to choose an action or its contrary. Faced with the rigid determinism of nature, Alexander opens the way, precisely in the sphere of interiority, to the capacity of choice as a bivalent faculty” (pp. 232-233).

“In Aristotle, action accomplished following a prohairesis is called willing if its principle is interior to the agent. But there are other willing actions (those of children and animals). In Alexander, prohairesis, which has become the faculty of choosing between a thing and its contrary, defines ‘what depends on us’; it is rational and distinct from (animal) willingness” (p. 233).

“The contingency of choice is rooted in an even more fundamental dimension; the logos is capable of contraries: [quote from Alexander:] ‘As for the things that are produced according to the logos, they seem to be produced by the logos insofar as one who does them has also the power (exousia) not to do them (kai tou me poiein). For it seems that what is produced by the artisans, according to their art, is not produced by them according to necessity; assuredly, they do each of these things insofar as they also have the equal power not to do them‘ ” (ibid).

Not only reason, but speech, language, and discourse are enlisted in service of radical contingency. These things do essentially involve contingency — that there be some things that are not set in stone. The fallacy here is to claim that denial of one absolute leaves no alternative but to affirm the opposite absolute. That is just not the case. Everything real is somewhere in between these extremes.

“Choice and art produce action and the work, while they can just as well not produce them. Thanks to discourse, I can say a thing and its negation; indeed I can choose a thing and its negation. Thus speech opens art to contingency, to the equal possibility of contradictories: to act and not to act, to produce and not to produce” (ibid).

That discourse and speech open up a space of contingency is a very valuable insight. It is the presumption that this contingency must be absolute that is wrong.

“Human actions depend on the mastery [sic] that the human has over her movements. The key to this mastery is our capacity to decide according to speech:” (ibid).

Again, let’s replace mastery with ability. Our ability to decide is real, but not absolute. It is an ability to be swayed by reasons, which is the opposite of an arbitrary imposition.

[quote from Alexander:] “These acts depend on us, while it seems that we are masters (kurioi) of accomplishing them and not accomplishing them. It is no longer possible to say that fate is their cause, nor that there are certain principles and certain exterior causes that are predetermining in themselves, in an absolute way, that such a thing is produced or not produced” (ibid).

True, fate is not the cause of our actions. But this doesn’t make us masters. The causes of our actions are reasons and beliefs and feelings, and our weighing of them. A human is a composite whole, not a pure choice operating in a vaccum.

“When an action depends on us, that is to say that we are the masters of accomplishing it or not. The key to the resistance to fate is the bivalence of the disposition of self: what it depends on us to choose, it also depends on us not to choose. It is not sufficient to explain action by impulse and assent, as the Stoics do. This explanation remains monovalent. But it is necessary to root action in reason, as the power (exousia) of contraries. We can do a thing and its contrary, because we can think a thing and its contrary, and choose between them” (p. 234).

Again, the argument is mostly valid. But the power of contraries is not a complete exemption from determination.

“Alexander characterizes ‘what depends on us’ as a positive power to choose contraries. It is a power we have mastery of by proairesis, which rests on reason, capable of contraries, and thus becomes a capacity to choose between them. It ties together two very different theses of Aristotle. The first comes from Metaphysics Theta: ‘All the powers associated with the logos are powers of contraries’. The second is formulated in ethics: among our actions, ‘those […] on which humans can deliberate, are those that depend on us to do or not to do’. The conjunction of two theses (metaphysical and ethical) allows Alexander to affirm that human action depends on our rational power; it is, as a consequence, radically contingent. In making the ambivalence of choice the result of a rational deliberation, Alexander avoids the objection that the doctrine of Epicurus incurred: he does not resort to an indeterminate and irrational variation to explain choice (in an even more obscure way). It is indeed the agent who is the origin of contingency, and precisely insofar as she is rational” (ibid).

This part of Metaphysics Theta is exactly the part that will later be used by Duns Scotus. I’ll do a separate post on it some time. I think this part of Aristotle’s text overemphasizes the importance of binary contraries. There are other texts like this in Aristotle that do not seem to reflect the devastating critique of Platonic division (or classification by dichotomy) that is developed in Book I of Parts of Animals. In this case I am inclined to think that the critique may have been developed late in Aristotle’s life.

Epicurus sought to explain human freedom by positing a random, uncaused “swerve” of the atoms. This collapses too many levels. The higher achievements of humanity are not mere random variations.

“Nonetheless, the problematic field has changed since Aristotle. In spite of his rejection of determinism, Alexander refers to the Stoic problematic, and retains the importance of interiority. For him, ambivalence leads back to the capacity to choose, in each one of us. What depends on us is to act according to our reason and our judgment: ‘what depends on us’ is henceforth identified with proairesis, understood as the interior power to choose or decide following a deliberation” (pp. 234-235).

“But in insisting on this faculty proper to the human, distinct from that of the animals, Alexander makes the boulesis (a wish) into a will. First of all, it is this faculty that centralizes desires and gives them its assent. What is more, it is exercised following a judgment (krisis) and a rational deliberation; it is indeed a ‘rational desire’ — the classic definition of will, from Saint Thomas to Leibniz. And above all, it is not reduced to the activities of the rational soul, because it is posterior to them, and it is the principle of the impulse to act; coming after the assent given to representations, it triggers action; and the body, in its turn, through the mediation of the tendons, obeys it. These are exactly the metaphysical properties of a will” (p. 235).

What Boulnois attributes to Aquinas and Leibniz is the “intellectualist” view of will, which only becomes relevant when the existence of a separate faculty of will is assumed.

“What is more, in contrast to desire according to Aristotle, the impulsive soul is itself unmoved. The psychology of Alexander is thus articulated with his non-determinist doctrine of action: whatever our representations, it is not them that move us; it is necessary that an impulse be joined with them: the ‘rational actions’ (new expression) differ from the movements of animals in that they are triggered by an impulse resulting from a rational judgment — and only those that are rational merit the name of action in the proper sense” (ibid).

Building on Alexander, Plotinus will further generalize the claim that the soul is unmoved. That representations by themselves do not move us seems reasonable. But thoughts, beliefs, and feelings do move us. (This implies that they are more than just representations, which I think is true.)

“Alexander pursues the movement of singularization and interiorization of ethics that was begun by the Stoics. But he makes it a non-determinist interiority, concentrated in the logos, capable of proposing to choice a thing or its contrary” (ibid).

“In this, Alexander of Aphrodisias goes against the grain of Aristotle. Certainly, Aristotle’s Metaphysics Theta starts from the idea that a being capable of speech is capable of contraries. But he concludes that even if there is a modal symmetry between contraries (the one and the other are possible), there is no real symmetry between them: the one is better, and the other is attained by privation; medicine aims at health, but it can also fail. Between possible contraries, it is necessarily our desire that dominates, and that determines one more than the other. In stopping at the premises of reasoning, Alexander profoundly modifies the sense: he leaves aside the necessary determination by desire; indifference between contraries has become the principle of the indetermination of choice. All medieval and modern speculation about the freedom of indifference is no more than a variation on this interpretation of Metaphysics Theta by Alexander” (pp. 235-236).

Ethics and the Dogma of Free Will

The last post treated Olivier Boulnois’s discussion of ethical deliberation and proairesis or “resolution” (which I formerly called “choice”) in Aristotle, which grounds Boulnois’s “genealogy of freedom”. Here are a few highlights of his discussion of how the very un-Aristotelian notion of free will emerged in the later tradition, along with parts of his conclusion.

Elsewhere I have used the common translation of Latin liberum arbitrium as “free will”, but more literally it is something like “free arbitration”, which is what a free will is characteristically supposed to do. In the context of this “archaeological” discussion where the terms appear side by side, the distinction matters.

Frequently, talk about will is fraught with ambiguity. Good will — and more generally, definite will as intent subject to interpretation — is a completely different thing from the indeterminate will conceived as a power of decision ex nihilo that is being criticized here, but the two are often mixed together.

“Voluntas did not always mean will, if we understand by that a directing principle of the powers of the soul, trigger of action and repose, and capable of contraries. The word is attested in classical Latin, in the sense of ‘favor’, ‘good disposition’ ” (Généalogie de la liberté, p. 254, my translation throughout). “[The Greek boulesis], which Cicero translated as voluntas, designates a sage emotion, a rational desire, the superior form that desire takes when the [Stoic] sage is no longer subject to passions” (ibid).

In the Stoics, we can see the beginning of an evolution toward modern concepts of will. But the Stoic usage properly applies only to the ideal of the Stoic sage. It is not yet a faculty of the soul that all humans are supposed to have.

According to Boulnois, the next major step was taken by Alexander of Aphrodisias, in late 2nd to early 3rd century CE. Standing near the beginning of the Greek Aristotelian commentary tradition, Alexander is the most historically influential of the Greek commentators. Relevant here are his arguments against Stoic determinism, in the non-commentary treatise On Fate.

“Is it necessary to define freedom as freedom of the will, or free arbitration? The problem of free arbitration, understood as a completely undetermined power to resolve [or choose], arises from Alexander of Aphrodisias, in a metaphysical rereading of Aristotle. In effect, Alexander is responding to a non-Aristotelian problematic, that of [Stoic] determinism. To do this, he establishes a connection between the concept of proairesis and the rejection of the cosmic determinism of the Stoics, thus giving birth to a ‘libertarian’ interpretation of decision, indeed to the concept of (undetermined) free choice. Where Aristotle affirms that we generically have the capacity to act or to not act, Alexander holds that we singularly, in each conjuncture, have the possibility to act or not, and to act otherwise. This is to say that proairesis becomes a faculty of choice independent of the state of the world — a free arbitration. And it is this concept, called ‘Aristotelian’ by Heidegger but in fact Alexandrian, that imposes itself, as well in [the early Augustine of the Treatise on Free Will] as in scholasticism, up to Descartes. It becomes necessary for this to consider not only action, but an interior power of choice. Free arbitration thus becomes free arbitration of the will” (p. 472, emphasis in original).

“In inventing a libertarian conception of action, Alexander [of Aphrodisias] founds an ethic centered on the capacity to choose for oneself a thing or its contrary, without depending on a preceding cause” (p. 248).

“The concept of free arbitration had already received its certificate of nobility from [the early Christian theologian] Origen…. But he implied no metaphysical thesis on determinism and indeterminism. It is Augustine who submits the concept of free arbitration to this problematic, and discovers the power of the will, in his Treatise on Free Will” (p. 253).

“But it is Augustine who made [voluntas] the founding concept of Western ethics, in joining it to that of free arbitration (liberum arbitrium). He made it the free arbitration of the will” (p. 255, emphasis in original).

“The Treatise on Free Will was at first conceived as a treatise on the good, in which Augustine demonstrated the divine goodness and the origin of evil, in opposition to the Manicheans. But to exonerate God, it was necessary to make the human will responsible for evil” (p. 256).

“The association of the will proper and free arbitration … suggests that the key of the fault [of original sin] resides in a power of choice belonging to the will. Evil does not come from nature, but from that will, in its exercise of choice…. Thus the first occurrence of [the phrase] free arbitration appeared at a crucial moment of reflection on the origin of evil” (p. 257, emphasis in original). “It is the human who is culpable, and God is innocent” (p. 259). “Willing is always in our power; in this consists our freedom” (p. 260).

“Augustine inherits the turn made by Alexander of Aphrodisias. Freedom of action has become a freedom of choice. And the power of choice is identified at once with the principle of assent to representations and the triggering principle of action: the will. Instead of a casuistry, instead of founding responsibility in the meeting of our beliefs and our desires, on the one hand, and on the circumstances of action, on the other, Augustine prefers to construct a unique and hidden inner principle, which is situated in an invisible part of the human (her soul); this principle is will, endowed with a free arbitration” (ibid).

Also influential in this context was the late 5th to early 6th century CE Roman Christian philosopher Boethius.

“In Aristotle, the problem of willing action and that of prescience of the future are totally disjoint. The first is treated in a reflection on ethical responsibility, the second in the framework of a logico-linguistic analysis of statements about the future” (p. 159). But “Boethius elaborates what will become the key argument: if the future is necessarily determined, free arbitration perishes, along with all moral responsibility” (ibid).

In the high middle ages, such arguments were developed to a fine pitch by the Latin scholastics. This turns out to be interrelated with the scholastic turn away from Aristotle’s own very innovative meta-ethical emphasis on the primacy of explanation by final causes, to a new privileging of a transformed notion of efficient cause that is closer to early modern mechanism than it is to Aristotle.

” ‘The final cause is not productive. That is why health is not productive, except metaphorically’ ” (p. 116). “At the end of the 13th century, Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus understood this passage in an absolute manner. They deduced that the final cause produces nothing, that it is not really a cause” (p. 117). Henry of Ghent wrote, ‘The good that is known, insofar as it is represented in the intellect, moves the will only in a metaphorical way’ ” (quoted, p. 117, emphasis in original).

Though highly sophisticated and genuinely original, this scholastic devaluation of the final cause completely undoes what Aristotle himself highlights as his most important accomplishment in first philosophy (the detailed working out of a unique “final causes first” way of thinking and understanding, which orients itself through a hermeneutics of “that for the sake of which”). The scholastic reversal of Aristotle’s distinctive emphasis on final causes (in favor of putting a transformed notion of efficient causality first) puts a value-neutral notion of sheer power in top position in place of the good at the origin of things. Not only the first cause but also human agency are re-visioned in terms of this creative misreading of efficient causality as not just the means by which ends are achieved, but as a primordial value-neutral driving impulse, or (in the case of God) a value-neutral supreme power of creation from nothing. In philosophical anthropology, this is accompanied by a devaluation of Aristotelian teleological “intellect” in favor of the new voluntaristic notion of will, as the human analogue of creation from nothing.

“For Henry and Scotus, our passage means that the intellect and its object do not move the will…. But this interpretation, which reduces finality to the conjunction of a representation and a subjective will, is a hazardous extrapolation: Aristotle speaks here only of the need to distinguish between a productive cause and a final cause (the aim pursued is not the efficient cause of movement). And all the rest of his thought implies a teleology, that is to say a motion by a final cause, even for the beings that have no representation” (ibid).

“The will ceases to be simply the excellence of good humans (as with the Stoics). It implies a mentalist theory and a causal theory of action. — 1) Mentalist: because all action is explained as the exterior deployment of a mental state…. –2 ) Causal: the will is the cause of action…. Action becomes the effect of the will” (pp. 260-261, emphasis in original).

“At first, the fundamental definition of freedom is strictly ethical. It consists in the absence of constraint and of ignorance, independent of any metaphysical position on determinism or causal indeterminacy” (p. 473). “For at the origin, in Aristotle, [desire and logos or discourse] are clearly distinct…. The aporia arises when in an articulation that is not ontologically clarified, we confuse desire and the logos in the concept of ‘will’ (since the Stoics and Augustine). Successfully to rethink this articulation is the challenge and the task of an ethics. This imposes on us the task of destroying this metaphysical confusion that obstructs the philosophy of action” (p. 475).

The reference to “destruction” might sound a bit shocking, but it refers back to Boulnois’s methodological preliminaries. There, he said

“In the element of thought, destruction and construction are one sole and same act…. My approach is a form of ‘discursive dissolution’: through dissolution, we approach the resolution of the problem.”

“To solve: resolve, destroy. Here it is not simply a matter of ‘deconstruction’…. Can we again philosophize after analytic philosophy? If the analytical method has a virtue, it is to conduct a rational reflection on problems, and to accept that they can have a solution” (p. 20, emphasis in original).

“It is undoubtedly impossible to give a complete analytic interpretation of the problem of freedom. It is likewise impossible to give a complete history of the diverse statements responding to the question. But paradoxically, what is impossible separately becomes possible conjointly.”

“I will reconstruct the principal sources of the doctrine of freedom, and of its intrinsic aporia. I attach myself particularly to the work of Aristotle….”

“When Aristotle affirms that an action ‘accomplished willingly engenders praise and blame, while an action accomplished unwillingly only engenders compassion (suggnome) and perhaps pity’; when Descartes declares that the freedom of indifference is ‘the positive faculty of determining oneself for one or the other of two contraries, that is to say to pursue or to flee, to affirm or to deny’; when Nietzsche demands, apropos of the eternal return: ‘do you will that again and innumerable times again?’, not only does it not concern the same thesis, but above all it does not concern the same question” (pp. 20-21, emphasis in original).

He devotes a whole subsection of the introduction to “the legitimacy of the middle age” as a field of scholarly endeavor.

“In studying the middle ages, we indeed study the hidden face of our history…. To choose the long path, which passes through the Middle Age, is to choose multiplicity and discontinuity” (p. 22).

“[T]here are not two eternal conceptions, one determinist, the other libertarian…. an alternative of which both terms were unknown to Aristotle, who envisaged neither free arbitration (but solely willingness) nor determinism (but only cause and responsibility)” (p. 23).

“This study supposes that we first research the origin and the structure of the question of free arbitration, then we examine the sense of action from Aristotle, as well as its obliteration under a theory of free arbitration” (ibid).

In the conclusion, he says

“The problem of free arbitration, or of the freedom of the will, is a metaphysical artifact for two reasons:”

“1. The will was introduced by the commentators on Aristotle through a complex series of translations and projections, such that rational desire (boulesis) became a will, which renders the primordial sense of action and of practical reason incomprehensible.”

“2. Freedom is not essentially a power of the soul, but a social and ethical aptitude.”

“To go further in the elucidation of the problem of freedom, it is necessary to destroy the concept of will, as the mental and causal principle of human actions. As Wittgenstein well saw, for this it is necessary to confront a radical analysis of action without reproducing this term (anachronistic in relation to Aristotle). For the idea of an interior principle, capable of contraries and cause of action, not only conceals an internal contradiction, but is a fiction that occults the different levels of action in which we are responsible.”

“We have given an account of the actions of which we are the authors. To be responsible for an action, it is necessary to be a cause. This signifies that the agent has the power to act, and for Aristotle, this is a bivalent power, to act or not to act in general. Aristotle never says that, in some precise conjuncture, given the beliefs and representations of the agent, she must have the power to do a thing and its contrary, and to not do what she does. For that is not the question: that is not what makes ethical responsibility; we are responsible for actions of which we are generically the origin; action depends on us, it is ours, when we are not constrained by an exterior force. That is also why we cannot excuse ourselves (exclude ourselves from the cause), by arguing that faulty action was necessarily brought about by our desires…. For our desires are part of us, and our action is not imputable to another…. To speak of a ‘weakness of the will’, is precisely to render the phenomenon incomprehensible” (pp. 175-176, emphasis in original).

“It is only through confusion with the problematic of future contingents that the metaphysical question of the contingency of choice emerged…. For Aristotle never claimed that our capacity to act or to not act now depends uniquely on us” (p. 477, emphasis in original).

“Free arbitration becomes the condition of responsibility, which makes free arbitration a necessary but indemonstrable condition of ethics. — This argument has a double inconvenience: first of all, it requires the admission of an indemonstrable principle; then, in making free arbitration the condition of morality, it prevents us from seeing the converse, that ethical orientation is constitutive of its concept” (p. 478).

“Fundamentally, freedom does not reside in a subjective power to determine oneself. Neither the term ‘will’ nor its functions exist at the origin, in Aristotle: we find neither a power that centralizes the other faculties of the soul, nor a principle of assent at the source of action….. It is ethics that founds freedom, and not freedom that founds ethics” (p. 479, emphasis in original).

“Freedom is not a postulate of practical reason; it is practical reason. And the human is not born free, but she may become so” (p. 481).

“Intellect” and the Body

The Latin scholastics invented strongly univocal concepts of “substantial form” and “intellectual soul”, and read them back into Aristotle. The work of Jean-Baptiste Brenet shows how this is interwoven with the prehistory of the modern notion of a psychological subject as a knower and agent.

In the book that served as his doctoral thesis, Brenet develops a case study of the “prince of the Averroists” John of Jandun, who turns out to be closer to his Latin peers than to Ibn Rushd (Averroes) himself. Brenet has also published French translations of Aquinas’ questions on soul and body from Summa Theologica, as well as a work On the Intellectual Soul by the English Averroist theologian Thomas Wilton, whose theses we will see are disputed by John of Jandun.

Averroes had insisted that it is only equivocally that intellect is said to belong to the same soul that is said to be the form of the body. According to Brenet, John of Jandun wants to avoid two extremes. The first, which he associates with Alexander of Aphrodisias, in effect makes the human intellect entirely material, by insisting on the univocity of Aristotle’s definition of the soul. The second, represented by Themistius, treats intellect entirely as a transcendent principle, and absolutely denies that it is the form of the body. This latter view is often mistakenly attributed to Averroes. But in any case, John of Jandun reverses this emphasis, and pushes for a more “Alexandrian” solution. He searches the text of Averroes in order to highlight all the passages where Averroes says or suggests that intellect, in spite of its transcendent dimension, is nonetheless also in some meaningful way ours.

“Against the noetics of Averroes, to which he opposes in the first instance the experience of personal thought, Thomas Aquinas maintains in his De unitate intellectus that intellect is ‘a power of the soul that is the form of the body’. He even comes to write in this polemical context that ‘intellect is the form of the body’. It is this ‘information’ that, according to him, confers to each of us a principle for thinking that is our own” (Brenet, Transferts du Sujet, p. 35, my translation throughout).

Siger of Brabant had argued against Aquinas that the relation between intellect and the body is not one of substance, but rather is a kind of operational unity. Intellect is not the substantial form of the body, but is properly called a sort of “intrinsic mover or operator” within the soul. John of Jandun “is a child of this inaugural dispute. He inherits words and formulas from it, but not only that: he subscribes to the scholastic idea and its expression, that it is the form of the body that gives thought to the human” (ibid, emphasis in original).

“In fact Averroes, who paid extremely close attention to the exact problem of the being of intellect in potentiality, did not really seek to know in what sense intellect, without qualification, could be the form of the body. On the one hand, it is in effect the perfection of the human [i.e., the composite of soul and body] that interests him; on the other hand, he nearly always proposes a divided approach to the question” (p. 46).

“Not only must we not speak vaguely of the relation of intellect to human individuals, but things do not go the same way with each ‘intellect’. What is involved may be the thought of an infant, or that of a sleeping person” (p. 47). “The essential of [Averroes’] Long Commentary is developed in the third book, in the arborescence of modes of possible junction for the human, when Averroes details the diverse degrees of mediation that lead to the immediate information of the intellect, acquired at the end of the theoretical stage of thought: at this moment, the agent intellect has become directly our form” (ibid, emphasis in original).

(Here we have explicitly an immediacy that is not originary, but rather is a product of mediation. Hegel was not the first to raise such a possibility.)

John follows Siger of Brabant in modeling human intellect on the celestial intelligences that were believed to move the spheres by which the motions of the stars were explained. Like Siger, he uses Averroes’ commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens to derive conclusions about human intellect that conflict with what Averroes says in his more famous Long Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul.

“If intellect is the form of the body, it is so insofar as it is an ‘operator’. Every form is a giver either of being or of operation: the intellectual soul is precisely forma dans operationem” (p. 72).

Not without some irony, Brenet observes that “If we abstract away the corruptibility of the individual body, as well as its composition, if we neglect the fact that intellect has need of the image and needs it in its primary operation, we can justifiably say that it is a ‘form’ analogous to the celestial intelligence that is the mover of a sphere ” (p. 84).

“Between an immaterial form and a body that are ontologically separate, there can exist a relation in the order of act, a purely functional relation…. Even if it is separate from its Intelligence in its being, [the celestial sphere] is united to it in a certain way, i.e., to recall what John says himself, ‘at least as subject‘…. subjectum or ‘place’: the sphere-subject gives place to movement, the act of the Intelligence has a place in this sub-jection ” (p. 85, emphasis in original).

“Certainly, the Parisian master could say, the anti-Avicennan and anti-Platonic empirical orientation of the noetics of Averroes means that the implication of the body in the elaboration of thought must be strong, but intellect only has need of the human body for making thought, and not for being there” (p. 86).

“If the celestial sphere is indispensable as subject-receiver of the act caused by the Intelligence, insofar as it receives movement, how can it be compared to the human body, which does not receive thought from the intellect and is not, in this sense at least, the ‘subject’?” (p. 87).

Note well that intellect is not said to be “received” by the human here. In this Averroes differs from Alfarabi and Avicenna.

“We do indeed find a cosmologico-noetic analogy in Averroes, but Averroes does not reason in the same way. He does not found noetics on cosmology, he does the inverse, and goes from analyses of the human intellect to say something about the celestial Intelligences” (pp. 87-88). “John of Jandun seems to reverse this relation when he layers noetics over cosmology” (p. 88).

For Averroes, this raises the “problem of Theophrastus [Aristotle’s collaborator and immediate successor]”: How can we say that the material intellect has no form of its own, and yet that it is a being?

“Nothing can be in act that we call a ‘this’, which is to say a body or a faculty existing in a body, like the sensory faculty. The absolute denuding of its being is the condition of its receptivity to universals; in order for it to potentially be the intelligible, there can be nothing of its own in its being-in-potentiality” (pp. 89-90).

Here he is effectively saying that no concrete particular can be “in act” in the Aristotelian sense. Being a particular involves accident, and accident is incompatible with pure act.

“If the material intellect is by definition ‘that which is in potentiality all the ‘intentions’ of universal material forms, and is not any being in act before having conceived it, it is excluded that its nature could be that of (prime) matter, that of the separate forms, or that of a hylomorphic composite” (p.91).

(I am inclined to think that the notion of prime matter (i.e., matter abstracted from the form with which it is ordinarily said to be inseparable, and supposedly having no properties of its own) is an interpolation due to Alexander of Aphrodisias.)

“As a consequence, the subject of the intelligibles… constitutes a being sui generis…. The interpretation that Averroes gives in the Long Commentary rests on a double rejection of the readings of Alexander of Aphrodisias and of Themistius” (p. 92).

Brenet quotes Averroes, “Alexander explains the demonstration of Aristotle concluding that the material intellect is not passive, that it is not something of which one says ‘this’, (aliquid hoc), that is to say a body or a faculty [existing] in the body, as intending the preparation itself [for the reception of intelligibles] and not the subject of the preparation. That is why he writes in his book On the Soul that the material intellect more resembles the preparation that is in the tablet that has not been written upon, than the prepared tablet itself” (pp. 92-93, brackets in original). Averroes continues, “But it is impossible to show the nature of the preparation proper to the intellect without having recourse to the nature of the subject, since the preparation proper to each subject is parallel to (currit cursu) the perfection and the form of the subject” (p. 93).

Brenet continues, “Otherwise said, Aristotle could not speak of the receptive power of the material intellect without considering the very essence of that intellect…. Averroes in effect rejects the idea that a form adjoining a corporeal substrate can be other than inhering in and mixed with it: an intellect-disposition of the body can only be a corporeal form whose implication in matter renders impossible any apprehension of the universal” (ibid).

Logical and epistemic access to universals is for Averroes neither natural nor supernatural. I like to call it “ethical”.

“As a consequence, contrary to what Alexander of Aphrodisias maintains, the material intellect is really or substantially the subject of the intelligible; it is not the accident of a support; it cannot be reduced to a pure disposition attached to the material composite” (p. 94). “Themistius errs too, because he makes the material intellect a substance in which is found the disposition to receive the intelligibles” (ibid).

“Averroes bases his conceptual elaboration upon the being of the material intellect, and it is this that governs his cosmologico-noetic analogy, i.e., a reflection on the subjectity of the subject of universals. His question is not: Is the receptive intellect a subject or not? but rather, What subject or what being must it be?” (pp. 95-96).

“Averroes and John of Jandun do not defend the same thesis. John holds that the intellectual soul is to the body of the human as the mover-intelligence is to the heaven it moves, whereas Averroes maintains that the ‘celestial body’, i.e., its ‘soul’, is to its intelligence and to the separate forms of the universe, that which the material intellect is to the agent intellect and to the intelligibles it receives. This does not mean that John’s idea, which remained very current throughout the Middle Age, is absurd, impossible, or absolutely contrary to what Averroes wanted to say” (p. 104).

“In not working on the problem of the ‘fourth kind of being’, John truncates cosmology and unbalances its relation to noetics…. The master of arts develops his reading of Aristotle and Averroes from the angle of a question that the Cordovan does not pose: what is it that unites intellect to the human body? Like Siger when he was cornered by Aquinas, he is already dominated by the will to find the kind of union that will allow us to say that hic homo intelligit [“this human understands”], or that homo formaliter intelligit [the human formally understands]” (p. 109).

“[Averroes] does not ask himself about the act that unites intellect and the human, but first of all about the very possibility of any intellectual act, about its material possibility. Under what conditions is the intelligible received? Where can it be received? These are his questions. He wants to determine what is the subject of thought, independent of seeking to know who thinks, which far surpasses the question of human consciousness and that of individual intellection” (ibid).

In a footnote, Brenet quotes Jean Jolivet: “The contingency of individual knowledge, the empiricity of its constitution, are overlooked by a globalizing conception of being, of thought, and of their adequation. Transposing the matter into modern terms (with the required precautions), one could say that Ibn Rushd elaborated a philosophy not of consciousness but of the concept, that puts itself on the same side as Aristotle, properly understood, but also that of Spinoza, Hegel, Marx” (p. 109n).

The “Averroist” theologian Thomas Wilton “judges that the agent intellect is neither a forma inhaerens nor a forma informans, but that it intervenes solely as forma assistens” (p. 116).

But “For the Parisian master, … our intellect is constituted by the possible intellect and by the agent intellect, and the latter is united secundum esse [in being] to the first. Clearly opposed to Thomas Wilton, the master of arts goes so far as to say [the agent intellect] is our form informans” (p. 117). “This comes back to his conception of the intellectus possibilis and of the intellectual soul: John in effect rejects the idea that the possible intellect should be in act, … just as he denies the fact that the agent intellect is not part of the human soul” (p. 118).

Next in this series: Imagination, Cogitation

Desire, Image, Intellect

In the previous post, we saw an argument developed by Giorgio Agamben that for the great medieval Italian poets Dante and Cavalcanti, there is a very close connection between love, imagination, and intellect, and that in this they were inspired by the controversial views of the great commentator Averroes in his Long Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul. Taking Agamben’s essay as a point of departure, Jean-Baptiste Brenet explores Averroes’ critique of his Andalusian predecessor Ibn Bajja on the relation between intellect and imagination.

Ibn Bajja is historically important for his very strong notion of the role of imagination in the constitution of a human being. He develops this as an elaboration of the Greek commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias’ view that the so-called material intellect is a “pure preparation”, and is purely immanent in a faculty of imagination that is ultimately grounded in the body. Alexander’s view partly anticipates modern empiricism. Averroes’ criticisms of Alexander and of Ibn Bajja partly anticipate some contemporary criticisms of empiricism.

Brenet begins by recalling Aristotle’s statement in book Lambda of the Metaphysics that the first cause “moves as the object of love” (quoted in Agamben and Brenet, Intellect d’amour, p. 35, my translation throughout). Following Alexander, Averroes repeats that “Every thing is related to the prime mover as the lover to the loved” (ibid, emphasis in original).

According to Brenet, Averroes holds that “[T]he human, in tending toward the prime mover, only achieves her desire in acquiring in a complete way her initially extrinsic intellect.”

“This idea here of mental acquisition is an Arabic concept, and not a Greek one” (ibid, emphasis added). It seems to have been Alfarabi who particularly developed the distinction between intellect “in habit [hexis]” and intellect fully “acquired”. In the tradition that Alfarabi founded, the “acquired” intellect is sometimes said to result from a human being’s “conjunction” with a transcendent “agent intellect”. Unlike Alexander, who identified the agent intellect (nous poietikos, literally “doing or making intellect”) with the intellect Aristotle associates with the first cause, Alfarabi and the subsequent Arabic tradition treated it as a distinct metaphysical entity subordinate to the first cause.

The sense of the distinction between “in habit” and “acquired” seems to oppose a common level of achievement and actualization to an extraordinary one, or perhaps an ordinary empirical psychology to a normative ideal.

Averroes in his early works generally follows Ibn Bajja on this issue, but later develops his own unique position.

“In [Averroes’] Compendium of the Metaphysics, he too recalls that that which moves the lover is nothing but the form (sura) of the beloved that we bear within ourselves. What form? Not the absolute intelligible that the lover’s intellect apprehends, but that singular one that her imagination summons: her phantasm” (p. 36).

Aristotle separately says that the first cause moves as the object of love, and speaks of the large role of imagination in what we might call the psychology of thought. Ibn Bajja and the early Averroes thoroughly merge these two considerations.

“When we say that the intellect moves itself toward the object of love, we should not see a metaphor that translates the tendency toward accomplishment. To describe the process of intellectual acquisition, Averroes poses that ‘we move ourselves toward the conjunction’ (dicimur moveri ad continuationem), and with him this recovers a veritable physics of thought…. or more precisely, cinematics…. Certainly, he says, we find a celebrated manner of apprehending movement, which consists in making it ‘a path toward perfection’, this path being distinct from perfection itself (via ad perfectionem quae est alia ab ipsa perfectionae). But there is another way, ‘more true’, according to which ‘movement […] does not differ from the perfection toward which it tends, except by the more and the less […]. Movement in effect is nothing other than the engenderment, part by part, of this perfection (generatio partis post aliam illius perfectionis)” (p. 37, emphasis and bracketed ellipses in original).

We have recently seen that Aristotle himself treats all motion as a kind of entelechy.

“Fascinating thesis, where movement is nothing but the thing itself in its partial realization” (ibid). He quotes Averroes, “To go toward heat is in a certain way heat itself” (ibid). He continues, “This is the model that applies to thought. To move oneself toward the conjunction is to go toward the complete intellect, that is to say to become it, part by part, being it more and more” (ibid).

As individuals we approach this completeness not by perfectly realizing some one particular thought, but primarily by simultaneously realizing many thoughts, from multiple perspectives. Spinoza seems to have been influenced by this, as well as by Averroes’ critique of the image.

Brenet also says that Averroes implicitly references Alexander’s remarks in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics (surviving Arabic fragments of this lost work having been recently translated to French) on the simultaneous continuity and discontinuity observable in the process of a body of water’s freezing. Averroes applies a similar combination of continuity and discontinuity to thought. Brenet suggests that Averroes compares arriving at determinate thought to a process of “freezing”, and suggests that Alexander’s model of simultaneous continuity and discontinuity holds good for the history of concepts and sciences as well.

“From Ibn Bajja, Averroes takes [the idea] that our concepts of things are composites. If they are, as universals, abstracted from matter, they conserve a form of materiality in that they only exist for us as applied to the images from which they are extracted. The concept is not simple, pure. It bears the mark of its concrete origin, and is first conceived only through this. That is to say, [the concept] only occurs in relation to the image which is its source, to the point of including this in its nature. That every thought is the thought of something signifies not that it aims at a noematic content, but that it is the thought of an image, of the intelligible of an image, and that necessarily the two, like all relational things, coexist while thought lasts. There is no concept but in presence of its image, with it, just as there is no son in act except by and from a father in act” (p. 38).

This is emphasizing the role of psychological immanence in thought, as distinct from thought’s objectivity, a transcendent object, pure structure, or an ideal concept in itself.

“In this composition, the required image plays the role of matter, not only as furniture, but in the sense that it is a point of support that must be integrated into the grasp of what is supported there. This is what the text repeats, that the concept is related to the imagined form, that it is attached to it, coupled. Copulatio in Latin translates Arabic irtibat, which designates a bond, like the rope that holds an animal. The universal only appears to humans in the copula to the image (from which proceed, moreover, language and speech). In its first aspect, thought thus presents two united sides, or better, occurs as their very ligature” (p. 39).

In more modern terms, even if thought primarily resides in inference rather than in some presented content, a psychologically immanent “content” corresponding to the image is nonetheless what gives it a point of application. Averroes emphasizes the role of immanent presentation in the form of images in the genesis of thought, while refusing to grant them normative status.

“That which is constitutive in the human, who is neither god nor angel, is a predisposition to think, and this, insofar as it is not mixed, necessarily has an anchorage. This pure mental aptitude is not floating, absolutely separated. It has its place, exists only as preparation of a subject, which, according to Ibn Bajja, can only be the image. By this, Averroes thinks Ibn Bajja means not only that imagination constitutes the substrate of which intellect as a power has need in order to exist, but that it is also, via the disposition of which it is the bearer, that in which thought in act is realized. The reading, which takes in a maximal sense the intermediary (mutawassit) status of the imagination, is dizzying. This would not only be the support of the faculty of thought, nor indeed, by the active images, the correlate of conception, but… the very space of intelligibilization, the place of the happening of the intelligible” (ibid, emphasis in original).

“Averroes, after having been seduced, contested this, bequeathing to scholasticism an exclusively negative portrait of his first master. The image in the intellect moves, it is not moved; it is subiectum movens, and not recipiens. What Ibn Bajja loses is the equivocity of the very notion of the power of thought. If we mean to designate the capacity for universalization, a universality latent but virtual, initially this works well for the image, which conceals an intelligible charge of multiple ‘states’ (ahwal) close to the universal immediately susceptible of becoming concept. But if we dream of the power to receive thought, which the tradition calls the ‘material’ intellect, this no longer works. Reading Ibn Bajja, writes the final Averroes, ‘it seems […] that he wanted to say that the material intellect is the imaginative faculty insofar as it is prepared for the entities that are in it conceived in act, and that there is no other faculty serving as subject for these intelligibles outside of this faculty’. But he was wrong. The image is only the landmark and the subject-mover, and not the subject-substrate (that which leads it to invest the body). Thought cannot realize itself in the place from which it is pulled, even though it depends on it, and if there must be an intermediary, a diaphaneity of the intelligible, and then a receptacle for what is extracted from the image, this can only be an intellect adjoining but substantially distinct (‘separated’), this ‘possible’ intellect about which Cavalcanti as a poet will repeat that in it ‘as in a subject’ (come in subiecto) the form ‘takes its place and its abode'” (p. 40, emphasis and ellipses in original).

For a general orientation to the point of view Averroes is expressing here, Brenet turns to Hannah Arendt, summarizing part of the argument of her Life of the Spirit.

“To think, she explains, consists in a retreat, withdrawing oneself from place, not from where one is, from the quotidian space of worry and noise, but from all place, from all space, from spatiality itself. For thinking has for its object ‘essences’, and essences, as generalities, products of a de-sensorialization or of a stripping away of matter, offer themselves subtracted from spatial qualities: ‘In other words, the “essential” is what applies everywhere, and this “everywhere” which gives to thought its characteristic weight, is in terms of space a “nowhere”. The thinking me which moves itself among the universals, the invisible essences, is strictly speaking found nowhere: it is a non-citizen of any state, in the strongest sense of the term — that which explains perhaps the precocious development of a cosmopolitan mentality among the philosophers'” (pp. 40-41).

“Cosmopolitan” literally means “citizen of the cosmos”, indeed an appropriate epithet for a philosopher. Thought is nonspatial in the sense that it cannot be reduced to “seeing” an image, as something immediately there in a place. He notes that she particularly singles out Aristotle as having understood “that this status of being a non-citizen is the state of nature of thought” (p. 41).

To be a “citizen” of the cosmos , or of the universal community of rational animals, makes one to an extent a “non-citizen” of one’s particular community. It is also to be capable of detachment from the immediacy and naturality of imagination in experience.

Brenet quotes Albert the Great’s summary of the views of Ibn Bajja. “They say that there is no possible intellect in the human that is the subject of the intelligibles insofar as they are intelligible, because for them the form thought (forma speculationis) […] cannot have a subject in which it is found, given that it is universal, that is to say valid everywhere and for all time — but if it had a subject, it would be necessarily individuated, since every form is individuated and determined by its subject. From this they concluded that what we call possible or potential intellect is that which is potentially the thinking (speculativus) intellect, and that this is the image (phantasma) in the imagination (phantasia)” (ibid, ellipses in original).

“Without following Avempace [Ibn Bajja], many ‘Averroists’ contemporary to Dante and Cavalcanti also insisted on a form of implantation of thought by the image. This is the case with Antonio di Parma, medical doctor and philosopher, whom the two poets could have read or crossed paths with. The problem for him is not to conceive of the non-place of the universal, the atopia of the concept as such, that which is in evidence. Inversely, it concerns a being-there that makes of thought, in spite of the substantial separation of the intellect, something other than a cosmic phenomenon without relation to the incarnate personality of the thinker. The solution is in the image. Thought indeed is abstracted from the image, it is pulled from it, but this does not mean that it ‘leaves’ (leaving us at the same time), as if intellectual abstraction corresponded to a transit of the form, from the place that is the image (where it is intelligible potentially), to another place (the intellect, where it would be in act). For the universal form there is no other place, since by the way properly speaking it ‘does not go outside of us’ (non exit extra nos) when we abstract. And not only does the intellect ‘think nothing outside of us’ (non intelligit extra nos), even if it is separated, but since thought does not happen somewhere else than there where the image is transmuted, it is ‘in us’ (in nobis) that it happens, so to speak, in place. Thought does not migrate, it is not exported, and the atopism of its being promotes the immanence of its fabric. The image, homeland of thought” (pp. 41-42).

But if the image is the homeland of thought, for Averroes and his many Latin followers it is not thought’s destiny.

“These philosophers nonetheless did not make the image their last word. The individual thought that conjoins the universal to the phantasm from which it is extracted is only a form of thought in mid-course, characteristic of the apprenticeship by which physical knowledge proceeds from the punctual experience of things. A human of this sort accedes to the true, but always in mediate fashion, in a dependency on the body that keeps the ‘thing itself’ at a distance. ‘The one who attains the theoretic rank, writes Ibn Bajja, certainly regards the intelligible, but through an intermediary, like the sun appearing in water, where what we see in the water is the image and not [the sun] itself’. The intelligible linked to the image, as a consequence, is like the sun reflected in water, or in a mirror, that is to say also an image, that it is necessary to go beyond if we intend to approach reality as closely as possible.”

“To express this going beyond, Averroes uses a strong term: abolition” (pp. 42-43, emphasis in original).

Brenet quotes Averroes: “The form of the intellect in habitus is corrupted and destroyed, and nothing remains but the material intellect” (p. 43, emphasis in original).

“Finally, the image and that which it founds are reduced to nothing, leaving the power alone faced with the full act” (ibid).

This is indeed strong language, almost ascetic in character. But the emphasis is not on a rejection of worldly being, but on a detachment from overly specific representations as they spontaneously arise. The goal is not abstraction or suppression of passion, but true universality.

“The notion of Entbildung in the ‘mysticism’ of Meister Eckhart is not without support — under the veil of sermons — from the Averroist idea of the effacement or the annihilation of phantasms. Entbilden is to dis-imagine, and this de-figuration imposes itself on the soul, to render it available to the highest truth” (pp. 43-44).

Meister Eckhart has become famous in popular spirituality as a mystic, but he was also the third German master of theology from the University of Paris after Albert the Great and Dietrich of Freiberg, and held important positions in the Dominican Order. Scholars increasingly emphasize the importance of his philosophical work. Brenet quotes from Meister Eckhart’s commentary on the gospel of John:

“This is why certain philosophers affirm that the agent intellect, which they call a separate substance, is united with us in the images (nobis uniri in phantasmatibus) thanks to its light that illuminates and penetrates our imaginative faculty by that illumination, and when this intellect is multiplied by multiple acts of intellection, it unites itself finally with us and becomes for us our form (tandem nobis unitur et fit forma) in such a way that we perform the works proper to that substance, which is to say that we intellectually know the separate beings, as these last know themselves. And according to these philosophers, this intellect is therefore in us an acquired intellect (iste est in nobis secundum ipsos intellectus adeptus)” (p. 44).

Someone might object that this passage only seems to refer to the Arabic tradition in a general way. References to Arabic philosophers are not exactly uncommon in scholastic theology. But I think Brenet’s implicit argument here is that the reference to the imaginative faculty in the passage suffices to establish that the philosophers mentioned are not just Arabic but specifically Andalusian in the tradition of Ibn Bajja, and this in turn allows us to safely infer that the reference is to Averroes, because it was overwhelmingly through translations of Averroes that the Latin-speaking world gained knowledge of the Andalusian tradition. In presence of such a reference, it seems unlikely that Eckhart’s explicit talk about “dis-imagination” is a mere coincidence.

“Why this abolition of the image?… Even if their competition was necessary and must expand, the images need to disappear because our current intellect, that of abstract thought, disengaged from the world, is never transmuted. There is no great work in the individual intelligence, no alchemy. The possible does not turn into the necessary, the transitory into the incorruptible, and the intellect in habitus must finally be corrupted in order to allow to subsist, under its collapse, only the in-itself universal and timeless power of thought that is the intellect called material” (p. 45).

“But the destroyed images have been indispensable (as a path, otherwise desired, that it is a question of traveling, and not as an impurity that it would be preferable to immediately get rid of)…. The image allows the power of thought to accede, not first to the act but beneath that, to its own power; in actualizing it, it opens it up to its essential capacity” (p. 46, emphasis in original).

“If it has to build its power (for it does not at first have it, being at first only an aptitude), our intellect must also increase its scope, to the point of maximizing it, and it is by the image that it can do so. The image that the human desires, in which and by which she desires, is for the person the space of the appropriation of thought. It is like the mark made on the concept that not only individualizes it, but imputes it and attributes it” (ibid).

“In his Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, which the Latins could read, Averroes recalls the progress of the material intellect toward the acquired intellect, and of the first he writes: ‘if this intellect strips itself of all potentiality, when human perfection is realized, it is necessary that its act, which is not itself, annihilates itself (yubtilu; destruatur)’. Stripping, then ruin of the fruit of the stripping. Intellect must divest itself of its power in actualizing itself in the thoughts of the world, then obliterate this actualization solidary with the images of things…. It is on this intentional nihilism, of which the image is the paradoxical operator, that felicity depends” (pp. 46-47).

Nonetheless, “The theory of thought by ‘conjunction’ is founded on a doctrine of desire, which raises the subalternate question of moral action. There is never thought except by desire” (p. 47, emphasis added).

Brenet recalls that in book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle explains choice by orektikos nous (desiring intellect) “or” orexis dianoetike (reflective desire), “and such a principle is a human” (quoted, ibid). Averroes in turn speaks of cogitatio — the cogitative faculty of the soul, responsible for deliberation — sometimes in terms of discursive reasoning and sometimes in terms of imagination, but it should be understood as both simultaneously. “The principle of the human is only made effective in the crossing and the permanent division of these two dimensions” (p. 48).

The claim is that without ever becoming exempt from desire, “[T]he intellect of the human can have as object not only the abstract intelligible but the separate intelligible, universal in itself” (ibid, emphasis in original). “For Averroes, convinced of the necessity of this thought that is literally supernatural (though operated in the world here below, and by the force of reason alone), the question is not one of knowing whether our intellect accedes to the pure intelligible, but of establishing how it does so, how it can do so, what is the power that will make it capable of this” (ibid, emphasis in original).

This worldly and rational “supernatural” is a technical consequence of Aristotle’s narrow identification of the natural with terrestrial materiality. I prefer to use the term “natural” in a more expansive way, as including both astronomical entities and the whole scope of Aristotelian teleology.

“Why are all the individuals not already thought ‘in’ the thinking intellect, in the way that Augustine held that all humans have sinned in Adam? The solution again draws on the image” (p. 50).

“We have said that there are two dispositions to think in the human. The first is that which her images procure; … the second follows on this, and is its reward. This is the disposition toward the supreme thinkable, which occurs when the intellect has been taken to the limits of its capacity by the cumulative effect of all kinds of images” (p. 51).

“As for the philosopher, the beatific thinker, she is intellectually subtracted from time, and as Ibn Bajja says, that of her which is eternalized does not ‘redescend’.”

“In spite of all this, knowledge does not remain without a body. Each singular body that wears out and perishes in its images must be constantly relayed if the resulting universal is to be a constant event…. [T]he body in its phantasms is dead. Long live the immense Body” (p. 53).

“While Dante wrote his Monarchy to defend in the name of Averroes the existence of a ‘multitude’ allowing all its power to be activated, the theologian Thomas Wylton in Paris wrote an ‘Averroist’ text also maintaining that what the intellect completes is always in the first instance the species and not the individual: ‘the first perfectible of the material intellect is not Socrates or Plato, nor is it the universal abstracted by the intellect, but human nature itself, which in itself and in relation to quiddity is one in all its supports, even though it is numerically distinct in them. Insofar as it is one in this manner, it is the first perfectible of the material intellect, and as such it is — if we speak of a determinate singularity within a species — neither numbered nor singular: one may call it singular, but [only in the sense of] a vague singularity‘” (ibid, emphasis in original).

Brenet has written an entire book on Wylton.

“It appears, but as a vague individual, of which we perceive only that it is some animal, or some human, an aorist, the indeterminate individual of which what follows must show the figure or the face” (p. 54, emphasis in original).

“The phantasm is abolished, indetermination advances, the images return. Desire resumes” (ibid).

Passive Synthesis, Active Sense

Husserl suggested an intriguing notion of passive synthesis, which I believe in his view would be the source of what Hegel calls mediated immediacy. Something like this could help round out the Kantian account of synthesis, which is strongly tilted toward active synthesis associated with deliberate conscious acts. Language is straining here; passive synthesis is just short of paradox. I think the idea here is that “passive” synthesis is synthesis that comes to us more or less ready-made, based on previous syntheses we have formed or socially assimilated.

Something related to this is also involved in the Aristotelian notion of a “common” sense, which in effect synthesizes our experience of sensible things into a unified whole. Aristotle’s remarks are in a very minimalist style, but were developed in a little more detail by the commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias. Kant and Aristotle both generally treat sense perception in passive terms, but Aristotle’s common sense clearly cannot be entirely passive. Many medieval authors working in the broadly Aristotelian tradition developed more detailed accounts of sense perception in general as also involving an active component.

These various efforts to describe such processes in terms that are neither purely active nor purely passive seem very important to me as laying the ground for a reasonable account of human agency, free of both voluntarism and simplistic determinism.