Chapter 4 of Pippin’s Hegel’s Practical Philosophy is concerned with the actualization of freedom. Hegel makes abundant use of the Aristotelian concepts of actuality and actualization. To begin with, Pippin wants to resolve worries that Hegel’s emphasis on the actuality of Spirit submerges the agency of individuals, or that it gives too strong a “providential” sanction to existing states of affairs. Hegel indeed had little use for the narrow “self-will” of individuals, and in his semi-popular lectures on the philosophy of history applied potentially misleading metaphors of providence and theodicy to history. As Pippin observes, the meaning especially of some of Hegel’s more rhetorical statements is sometimes “profoundly unclear”, and apparently at odds with his more careful articulations.
If we step back and consider what actuality is in both Aristotle and Hegel, individualization is one of its fundamental characteristics. Actual things are specific, concretely embodied, and indeed particular. The actuality of spirit is not some ghostly presence over and above things, but lies rather in the concrete actions of individual people as ethical agents. And actuality, as Pippin notes, “is not merely a question about whether a concept does or does not have instances corresponding to it in the real world” (p. 95).
Hegel distinguished “ideas” from mere concepts precisely as taking into account their actuality and embodiment. In language that could very easily be misunderstood, he also spoke of the concept giving itself its own actuality. Pippin begins to explain this by noting that concepts for Hegel always involve an “ought”. They are “rules telling us how to make categorical distinctions, principles that govern material inferences, that prescribe what ought or ought not to be done” (p. 97), and “the Concept” with a capital “C” just is normativity. All concept use is involved with considerations of rightness. “By virtue of what is one inferential move legitimate, another not?” (ibid). To be able to judge what anything is, we must be able to distinguish it from what it is not.
Hegel gives unqualified praise to Kant’s thesis that the unity of the concept is none other than the unity of apperception. Pippin says this gives the concept a non-empirical origin that ties it to self-legislation. “[A]ll judgment rests on excluding and inferring relations [Brandom’s material incompatibility and material consequence] that constrain what we can intelligibly think and articulate by normatively constraining ‘what we ought to think’, not by being psychological propensities or limits” (p. 99). This all has to do with the determination of what is right, not with any causing of things to exist in a certain way.
Pippin says the whole third part of Hegel’s Logic – the “logic of the concept” – is concerned with these Kantian considerations related to self-legislation. He concludes that actuality for Hegel especially refers to the objective validity of a normative status, not simple existence. This is what is behind Hegel’s famous and tremendously misunderstood phrase “the rational is the real, and the real is the rational”. Both reason and actuality or reality for Hegel are normative concepts.
Here we have an answer to the worries about a conservative providential seal on factual existence. What is metaphorically said to be governed by something like rational providence is not factual existence but normative validity. “The Science of Logic’s argument suggests that… such a responsiveness to reason… is neither an imposition nor an unreflective subordination to the ‘practically given’” (p. 102).
In talk about self-legislation “The point being made is about the autonomy of the normative domain, in both theoretical and practical contexts. It is because of this claim that Hegel is completely untroubled by the threat of scientific or any other form of determinism…. This is not a claim about the theoretical requirement of an uncaused spontaneity of thought, as Kant flirted with…, but a claim about the space of reasons itself and what could and could not in the Hegelian sense be ‘logically’ relevant to it” (p. 103).
For Hegel, conceptual determinacy is not separable from conceptual legitimacy. Normative authority is “constructed we might even say, not discovered” (p. 104). Pippin says Hegel’s notion that the concept should be understood as a “free” structure only makes sense in these terms. “Conceptual legitimacy is not secured by being shown to be hooked onto the world in a certain way, but by virtue of its being instituted and sustained in the right way” (p. 105).
Hegel is concerned to develop “a theory of the possibility of content in general – how concepts in their judgmental use and claims to normative authority, might successfully pick out and re-identify an aspect of reality” (p. 107). For both Kant and Hegel, objectivity is no longer a matter of representation, but rather a matter of a kind of legality. “[W]e will not be searching about in the metaphysical or empirical world for the existent truth-makers of such claims” (p. 109).
“Whereas Kant held out some hope for a deductive demonstration of a notion’s or a norm’s actuality, or objectivity or bindingness, Hegel’s procedures in all his books and lectures are developmental, not deductive…. The proof procedure shifts from attention to conceptually necessary conditions and logical presuppositions to demonstrations of the partiality of some prior attempt… and the subsequent developments and reformulations necessary to overcome such partiality” (pp. 109-110).
“I am only subject to laws I in some sense author and subject myself to. But the legislation of such a law does not consist in some paradoxical single moment of election…. The formation of and self-subjection to such constraints is gradual and actually historical” (p. 117).